In this chapter I would like to deal with the question of how it is possible for perfectly normal and average people to decide, in certain situations, to kill. In order to answer this question, I recently attempted to reconstruct the murderous career of a reserve police battalion, devoting special attention to the situative dynamics and the procedural aspects of the work of killing.
part of their identity. The scientists who worked on eugenic experiments or who drafted plans for the settlement of the 'Eastern territories' (Ostgebiete) were not 'pseudoscientists', but cultivated people who used their internationally recognised qualifications for anti-human purposes. As Goetz Aly remarks: 'Catholic priests blessed the weapons for a crusade against godless Bolshevism, and at the same time resisted the crimes of euthanasia.'
2 Certainly more than a few Germans did not care for the Jews but nevertheless shopped in Jewish stores because they were less expensive. And, by the same token, there were certainly people who could wax indignant about the shameful treatment of Jewish judges and were ashamed of what was being done to these people, but nevertheless took advantage of the opportunity to buy a comfortable armchair or a pretty landscape where it was cheap: at the 'Jewish stalls' (Judenkisten ( ( ) on Hamburg's 'Kamerun Quay', for example, where 'Aryanised' furniture expropriated from Belgian and Dutch Jews who had been deported or forced into emigration was sold off.
3
Even if we think about ourselves, there are considerable discrepancies between our moral claims and our actions. Depending on the situation, we are all capable of acting, speaking and being interpreted in very different ways. We permit ourselves, for example, 'bad' behaviour in certain situations despite 'knowing better', and we master lies and contradictions, and disregard their opposites, trust, integrity and respect. Moreover, such self-examination immediately reveals something else. If we think about the patchwork of our moral existence, for every facet that seems morally somewhat questionable even to ourselves, we immediately try to legitimise why we did this or that against our better judgement, why we could not live up to our capacities, what the reason was for having to lie, cheat, betray or disappoint. Astonishingly, we generally find good reasons why behaviour felt to be wrong seems, in retrospect, to be sensible and thus, at least to ourselves, justified; and we need such reasons in order to do justice to our own moral claims, even if we acted against them 'in exceptional circumstances'. So how did the perpetrators perceive themselves? And how was it possible for them to do things that, only months before, they would have thought they could never do?
One of them said, 'I am not the monster I am made out to be. I am the victim of a fallacy.'
